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Abstract: 
 
Scholars are beginning to understand the evolution of electoral sentiment across countries.  
Recent research shows that early vote intention polls – from years before Election Day – contain 
substantial information about the final result but that they become increasingly informative over 
the election cycle.  The degree to which this is true varies across countries in important and 
understandable ways given differences in political institutions, but the pattern is strikingly 
general.  What we do not know is whether and how the characteristics of political parties matter.  
Do preferences evolve differently for niche and catch-all parties?  For government and 
opposition parties?  For new and old parties?  This paper addresses these issues.  We consider 
differences in political parties and how they might impact voter preferences over the course of 
the election cycle.  We then outline an empirical analysis relating support for parties in pre-
election polls to their final vote in legislative elections.  The analysis relies on 23,000 vote 
intention polls in 31 countries since 1942, covering 212 discrete electoral cycles and 
encompassing 236 political parties. Our results indicate that party characteristics are important to 
the structure and evolution of preferences, and that the size and age of parties matter most of all.  
Preferences for smaller and older parties crystallize early and remain strikingly stable over the 
course of the election cycle by comparison with larger and newer parties.  Though the patterns 
are as we expected, the details are somewhat surprising, as we will see.   
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How do election outcomes come into focus over the electoral cycle?  Are voters’ preferences in 
place early?  Or do they come into focus very late?  Do preferences evolve in a patterned way?  
Answers to these question tell us a lot about the underlying structure of preferences and also the 
effects of election campaigns.  If preferences are highly structured and in place early on, voters 
are less subject to influence during the official election campaign.  By contrast, if preferences are 
not highly structured, voters may be influenced by everything that happens between elections.  
While we know a lot about what voters do on Election Day, we know comparatively little about 
the evolution of electoral sentiment over time (for reviews of the literature, see Jacoby 2010; 
Heath 2010; Dalton and Klingemann 2007).   
What we do know mostly comes from the United States.  Erikson and Wlezien (2012) found that, 
at the beginning of the election year, there is virtually no relationship between the results of 
presidential polls and the actual vote.  By Election Day, poll results virtually match the final 
result.  In between, polls become more and more accurate.  Bafumi et al (2010) detect a similar 
pattern in US Congressional relying on the “generic” ballot, in which respondents are asked 
which party’s candidate for Congress they would vote for in in their district.  These preferences 
are more informative than presidential polls are (of the presidential vote) early in the election 
year but less informative at the end of the election cycle.  Polls for parliamentary elections in the 
UK are informative much earlier still (Wlezien et al 2013), and begin to come into focus years 
before Election Day.     
Very recent comparative analysis supports and extends these findings.  Jennings and Wlezien 
(N.d.) examine the polls-vote relationship in over 300 election cycles in 45 countries and reveal a 
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general pattern: polls become increasingly informative about the vote over the election cycle but 
very early polls contain substantial information about the final result.  There also demonstrate 
significant variation: the evolution of preferences differs across countries, reflecting differences 
in political institutions.  First, preferences come into focus much later in presidential elections 
than parliamentary (and other legislative) elections.  Second, preferences are more structured 
throughout the election cycle in party-centric electoral systems.   
The results of previous research are intuitively satisfying.  They indicate that voters’ support for 
political parties do come into focus over time – and in seemingly sensible ways – and that the 
pattern differs across government and electoral institutions in understandable ways.   The 
research does not consider differences in political parties themselves.  Do electoral preferences 
evolve similarly for all parties? Or does the pattern differ depending on their characteristics?  
There are numerous possibilities here, most notable of which may be whether parties are in 
government or opposition, as is suggested by the literature on economic voting (e.g. Fiorina 
1981; Anderson 1995; Duch and Stevenson 2008).  Another is whether parties are catch-all or 
niche.  The size and age of parties also could matter.  The impact of party characteristics also 
could depend on the type of government and electoral institutions.  Clearly, there are many 
possibilities. 
In this paper, we consider whether and how the characteristics of political parties structure the 
evolution of electoral preferences in systematic ways.  To begin with, we review the previous 
research and consider how differences in political institutions might impact voter preferences 
over the election cycle.  We then describe our empirical analysis relating support for political 
parties in pre-election polls to their final Election Day vote.  The results reveal that party 
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characteristics are important to the structure and evolution of preferences, and that the size and 
age of parties matter most of all.  Preferences for smaller and older parties crystallize early and 
remain strikingly stable over the course of the election cycle by comparison with larger and 
newer parties.  This may come as little surprise.  What may surprise is that the difference 
between catch-all and niche parties matters little when taking into account party size.   
 
Polls and the Vote over the Election Timeline 
Consider the timeline of elections (following Erikson and Wlezien 2012; also see Wlezien and 
Erikson 2002).  We start the timeline immediately after the previous election.  We end it on 
Election Day.  Many events occur over the timeline, some very prominent and others routine.  
We want to know whether these events have effects.  We also want to know whether the effects 
last.  
Ideally we would use time series analysis.  That is, we would examine the relationship between 
polls at different points in time within the various election years taken separately or pooled 
together. For instance, we could estimate the following equation of the vote division (Vt) in the 
polls during a particular election cycle to be of the following form: 
 Vt =  +  Vt-1 + ut,                                                (1) 
where Vt is the vote percentage for a particular party and ut is a series of random campaign 
shocks.
1
  That is, preferences on one day are modeled as a function of preferences on the 
preceding day and the new effect of campaign events, broadly defined.   
                                                 
1
 These are assumed to be independent and drawn from a normal distribution.  
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In theory, this equation tells us exactly what we want—whether there are shocks to preferences 
(and how much) and whether changes to preferences decay or last.  In practice, however, it is not 
so straightforward because of data limitations.  There are two main problems.  First, data 
frequently are commonly missing for daily and weekly periods and sometimes even for months.  
This has fairly obvious implications for what we can do with standard time series techniques.  
Second, the ratio of sampling variance to the true variance often is quite large.  This has 
substantial, if less obvious, complications: the presence of sampling (and other survey) error 
makes it difficult to uncover the underlying process.  
What can we do instead?  Erikson and Wlezien (2012) proposed treating the data not as a series 
of time series but as a series of cross-sections—across elections—for each day of the election 
cycle.  With the data organized as a series of cross sections, we can assess how polls and the vote 
across elections match up at different points in time.  Specifically, we can estimate the following 
equation relating the Election Day vote across elections j to the polls across those same election 
years on each day T, which indicates the number of days before the election: 
         jTjTTTj
eVbaVOTE 
 .                                                                                              (2) 
We are interested in seeing how the regression coefficients (bT) and the root mean squared errors 
(RMSEs) evolve over time.  Sampling error is not a problem for such an exercise; whereas error 
may swamp the variance from true change when observing within-election polls, it is dwarfed by 
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election-to-election (and party-to-party) differences in the cross-section.
2
 However, the problem 
that pre-election polls are sometimes sparse and conducted at irregular intervals remains.   
When readings of electoral preferences are missing, we can interpolate daily voter preferences 
from available polls.  For any date without a poll, an estimate is created as the weighted average 
from the most recent date of polling and the next date of polling. Weights are in proportion to the 
closeness of the surrounding earlier or later poll.
3
  Where we interpolate, we also introduce a 
random component based on the poll variance -- controlling for country, party and election -- to 
reflect the uncertainty associated with the imputed values.  We thus are able include in our 
analysis any election cycle from the moment the first poll is conducted in that cycle.  This would 
not be acceptable in conventional time series analysis, as interpolating would compromise the 
independence of observations.  Given that the methodology is explicitly cross-sectional, there is 
                                                 
2
 Consider that, when measured across presidential elections in the US between 1942 and 2008, 
the variance in the vote exceeds the error variance by a factor of 50 or more.  For instance, when 
the vote is measured as 30-day cross-sections, the minimum of the estimated reliabilities is 0.98, 
i.e., virtually all of the difference across elections is real.   
3 Specifically, given poll readings on days t - x and t + y, the estimate for a particular day t is 
generated using the following formula:  
                ^  
            Vt = { [y * Vt-x + x * Vt+y] / (x + y) } + , 
 
where , is drawn from the following distribution: μ=0, σ=3.394.  Recall that for days in the 
timeline after the final poll before an election, we carry forward the numbers from the final poll.  
This has some consequence for the accuracy of poll predictions very close to Election Day, as we 
use polls from well before the end of the cycle in some cases.     
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no such problem—interpolating actually permits a more fine-grained analysis.  The main 
drawback of the approach is that we cannot assess whether dynamics differ across particular 
elections.  Importantly, the method allows us to assess patterns of correspondence across 
elections in different subsets of elections, e.g., across types of systems and political parties.   
 
   
Research on Polls and the Vote  
As discussed, there is evidence of lasting influences from pre-election polls in various countries.  
In these vote intention polls, survey organizations typically ask respondents which candidate 
they would vote for “if the election were held today.”  The results of these polls tell us only a 
little about the persistence of specific events, as it is difficult to even identify their effects.
4
  The 
polls can tell us quite a lot about general patterns, however, as we can assess how poll results at 
different points of the election cycle match the final results.  If polls are increasingly informative 
across the timeline, then we know that electoral preferences change and the some of the change 
lasts to impact the outcome.  If polls are equally well informative across the timeline, then either 
(1) preferences do not change or else (2) preferences do change but these innovations do not 
                                                 
4
 It is difficult to characterize the effects of events for at least three reasons.  First, the effects of 
most events are small, with exceptions such as party nominating conventions (e.g., Holbrook 
1996; Shaw 1999; Erikson and Wlezien 2012) and possibly candidate debates (e.g., Johnston et 
al 1992; Holbrook 1996; Shaw 1999; Blais et al 2003). Second, survey error makes the effects of 
events hard to detect (see Wlezien and Erikson 2001; Zaller 2002).  Third, the net effects of 
different campaign activities can cancel out.  For additional details, see Erikson and Wlezien 
(2012).   
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persist, i.e., the fundamentals remain the same.
5
     
Scholars have found that, at the beginning of the election year in the US, some 300 days before 
the balloting, there is virtually no relationship between the results of presidential polls and the 
actual vote.  At the end of the cycle, by contrast, poll results virtually match the final result.  In 
between, polls become more and more accurate.  This is revealing about voter preferences.  It 
tells us that they change over the election year and in meaningful ways: although much of the 
change that we observe is short-lived, and dissipates before Election Day, a substantial portion 
carries forward to impact the final outcome.
6
   
Polls and the vote in US Congressional elections exhibit a similar pattern (Bafumi et al 2010).  In 
the “generic” ballot, survey organizations ask respondents which party’s candidate for Congress 
they would vote for in in their district.  These measured preferences are more informative early 
in the election year.  They also are less informative towards the end of the election cycle.  Polls 
for parliamentary elections in the UK are informative earlier still (Wlezien et al 2013), starting to 
come into focus years before Election Day.     
Very recent comparative analysis (Jennings and Wlezien, N.d.) supports and extends these 
findings based on analysis of polls and vote in over 300 election cycles in 45 countries. To begin 
with, they demonstrate that polls become more revealing about the outcome the closer the 
                                                 
5
 Where the latter is true, we may see a late uptick in the correspondence between polls and the 
vote owing to short-term effects that arrive late and do not fully decay before Election Day.  
6
 Voters are, at least to some extent, “online processors,” updating their preferences based on 
new information about the parties and candidates (see Lodge et al 1995). 
9 
 
election in all countries, but that early polls do contain substantial information about the final 
result.  They also show that the pattern differs and that political institutions matter.  First, 
electoral preferences come into focus much later in presidential elections than in legislative 
elections in parliamentary and presidential systems.  Second, preferences are consistently more 
structured -- from early on in the election cycle until Election Day -- in party-centric systems, 
which mostly are in countries with proportional election rules.  While the research teaches us 
quite a lot about the evolution of electoral preferences across countries, it leaves a lot 
unexplained.  In particular, it reveals little about whether and how patterns differ across political 
parties.   
Political Parties and the Polls and the Vote 
Political parties are central to voters’ electoral preferences, and this is true whether people 
actually voter for parties or candidates (see, e.g., Duverger 1954; Campbell et al 1960; Lipset 
and Rokkan 1967; for a review see Boix 2007). Parties differ in many ways, of course, and there 
is reason to expect that some of the differences matter for the structure and evolution of electoral 
preferences over time.  There are a number of leading suspects in the literature on party systems 
and political behavior: catch-all vs. niche parties, small vs. large parties, government vs. 
opposition, and old vs. new parties.  Let us onsider how these characteristics might influence the 
formation and stability of preferences across the timeline of elections. 
 
Catch-all vs. Niche Parties 
Much research, at least since Kircheimer (1966), recognizes the difference in the scope of 
parties.  Some “catch-all” parties tend to be more mainstream and focus on a range of issues that 
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have been and are on the political agenda, and are less tied to the representation of specific 
sectors of society.  Others “niche” parties are less mainstream and concentrate on particular 
issues that commonly are different from those on which mainstream parties compete (Meguid 
2005; 2008).  These differences are well-known, and there also is research considering their 
consequences for party behavior. 
 
There are reasons to think that support for niche parties will be structured earlier in the election 
cycle.  First, their constituency is narrower and concerned with particular niche issues, and so 
will be less likely switch to opposition (mainstream) parties, i.e., preferences should be fairly 
stable.  Second, the behavior of niche parties also matters, as they tend to maintain a distinctive 
platform that encourages stable party support. Third, there may be more fluidity, or “switching,” 
in voter choices among catch-all parties, than among niche parties or between niche and catch-all 
parties.  Support for the latter thus should evolve significantly over time.  
 
Research on party behavior tends to support this expectation.  Most notable is Adams et al. 
(2006), which considers whether the type of party makes a difference to dynamic representation 
of public opinion in party platforms. They found that niche parties do not respond to shifts in 
public opinion while catch-all parties do.  They also found that niche parties seem to have an 
incentive to not respond, as they are penalized at the ballot box when they do moderate their 
positions.  This is not to say that there are no incentives for niche parties to change their 
positions (especially see Meyer and Wagner 2013), just that this is less likely than for catch-all 
parties.  The research suggests that electoral preferences for niche parties, further from the 
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median, will be more durable and will be structured far earlier in the election cycle.  Of course, 
we need to and can directly test the possibility. 
 
Party Size 
Political scientists also recognize that the size of parties differs and has consequences for voters 
(van der Brug et al 2007).  This partly relates to the catch-all vs -niche scope of parties discussed 
just above, as niche parties tend to be small.  It also relates to the attribution of responsibility to 
governing parties, which we consider below. We also can assess the independent effects of size, 
for instance, by seeing whether and how party size matters among catch-all parties, keeping in 
mind that niche parties are by definition fairly small.   
 
Government vs Opposition Parties 
Theories of electoral behavior suggest that voters’ preferences are based on the record of parties 
or candidates. Whether parties are in the government or opposition thus may be important.  The 
(conditional) retrospective voting model of Fiorina (1981) is an important point of theoretical 
reference here (also see Downs 1957; Key 1966).  In the model, voters’ preferences are based on 
the performance of the sitting government, a referendum judgment.  The model finds 
considerable support in work on economic voting (e.g., Powell and Whitten 1993; Lewis-Beck 
and Stegmaier 2000; Duch and Stevenson 2008), where voters' preferences are a function of 
economic evaluations.  Most of the literature shows (or assumes) that late economic conditions 
matter—the slope of the economy leading up to Election Day (see Wlezien N.d.). This is 
supported by broader research on valence politics (e.g., Clarke et al. 2004; 2009). There thus is 
reason to suppose that preferences for governing parties evolve over time, being less structured 
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early on and coming increasingly into focus leading up to and during the campaign as voters take 
stock of performance. Support for opposition parties, by contrast, should tend to more stable and 
structured as voters do not tend to adjust their preferences in response to new information about 
the government. 
 
We know that not all governing parties are the same.  As noted above, there is reason to suppose 
that evaluations of economic (and other aspects of) performance are more consequential for the 
main governing party (see van der Brug et al 2007).  This implies that the structure and evolution 
of preferences will differ, evolving more for large parties in the coalition and less so for smaller 
ones.  A similar difference may pertain to opposition parties, at least to the extent that shifts to 
and away from the largest governing party are especially felt by the largest opposition parties.  
Whether this is true can be assessed empirically. 
 
Old vs New Parties 
Converse (1969) argues that there is reason to think that the age of democracy is important to the 
formation and evolution of preferences, as partisan loyalties take time to take root.  This led us 
previously to posit that the age of democracy may be important for the dynamics of electoral 
preferences, being more fluid in new democracies than in older ones (Jennings and Wlezien 
N.d.).  As Converse’s logic centers on partisan loyalties, there really are two expectations, one 
relating to the age of the party system and the other relating to the age of parties themselves.  
New parties can emerge in old systems after all, and we can assess whether and how much this 
matters for preference formation.  More specifically, Converse suggests electoral preferences for 
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older parties will more structured than for younger parties, for which partisan loyalties are less 
developed.  
 
Poll Data 
Pollsters have sought to measure citizen’s preferences for candidates or parties for almost three 
quarters of a century.  While varying due to differences in context, most pre-election polls ask 
how citizens would vote “if the election were held today.”  We have compiled what we believe is 
the most extensive comparative dataset ever assembled of national polls of the vote intentions for 
presidential and legislative elections.
7
  Note that exit polls are not included in our analysis. The 
dataset consists of 26,917 polls spanning the period from 1942 to 2013.  (Supplementary 
Appendix S1 details the sources.)  The data cover a total of 312 elections (including 22 run-off 
elections) in 45 countries, 13 of which are pure presidential systems, 28 of which are 
parliamentary systems, and 4 of which are mixed, including a president and a parliament.  All 
told, we have poll data for presidential elections in 23 countries and legislative elections in 31 
countries, summarized in Table 1.  For this paper, we focus only on legislative elections (where 
we have 22,948 polls).  For these 235 elections, we have 740 polls per country on average for 
approximately 8 elections per country, or about 98 polls per election cycle.  Given the average 
                                                 
7
 In every poll in our dataset respondents were asked for which candidate or party they would 
vote; we ignore cross-national and within-country differences in question wording.  Lau (1994) 
shows that in the US such differences matter little for poll results, McDermott and Frankovic 
(2003) demonstrate that some are consequential. To the extent wording does matter, it serves to 
introduce error into our measure of electoral preferences.    
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interval—1,143 days—between elections, we are missing polls on most dates and in many weeks 
and even months.   
Table 1. Poll Data in 45 Countries, 1942-2013 
Country System Election Rule 
First 
poll  
Last 
election 
Australia Parliamentary 
Legislative (1
st
 Pref) SMDP 1943 2013 
Legislative (2
nd
 Pref)* SMDP 1993 2013 
Belgium Parliamentary Legislative PR 2004 2010 
Bulgaria Parliamentary Legislative PR 2009 2013 
Canada Parliamentary Legislative SMDP 1942 2011 
Croatia Parliamentary 
Legislative PR 2008 2011 
Presidential Majority 2009 2010 
Czech 
Republic 
Parliamentary Presidential Majority 2012 2013 
Denmark Parliamentary Legislative PR 1960 2011 
Finland Parliamentary Legislative PR 2010 2011 
Finland Parliamentary Presidential Majority 2006 2012 
Germany Parliamentary Legislative PR 1961 2013 
Greece Parliamentary Legislative PR 2007 2012 
Hungary Parliamentary Legislative PR 2009 2010 
Iceland Parliamentary 
Legislative PR 2009 2012 
Presidential Plurality 2012 2012 
Ireland Parliamentary Legislative PR 1974 2011 
Italy Parliamentary Legislative PR 2012 2013 
Japan Parliamentary Legislative PR 1998 2012 
Malta Parliamentary Legislative SMDP 2012 2013 
Netherlands Parliamentary Legislative PR 1964 2012 
New 
Zealand 
Parliamentary Legislative SMDP/PR 1975 2013 
Norway Parliamentary Legislative PR 1964 2013 
Poland Parliamentary 
Legislative  PR 2010 2011 
Presidential Majority 2011 2011 
Serbia Parliamentary Legislative PR 2008 2012 
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Slovakia Parliamentary Legislative PR 2010 2012 
Slovenia   Parliamentary Presidential Majority 2012 2012 
Spain Parliamentary Legislative PR 1980 2011 
Sweden Parliamentary Legislative PR 2000 2010 
Switzerland Parliamentary Legislative PR 2010 2011 
Turkey Parliamentary Legislative PR 2010 2011 
U.K. Parliamentary Legislative SMDP 1943 2010 
Argentina  Presidential Presidential Majority 2006 2011 
Brazil Presidential Presidential Majority 2002 2010 
Chile Presidential Presidential Majority 2008 2010 
Colombia  Presidential Presidential Majority 2010 2010 
Cyprus Presidential Presidential Majority 2007 2013 
Ecuador Presidential Presidential Majority 2010 2013 
Mexico Presidential Presidential Plurality 2005 2012 
Paraguay Presidential Presidential Plurality 2013 2013 
Peru Presidential Presidential Majority 2006 2011 
Philippines  Presidential Presidential Plurality 2010 2010 
South 
Korea 
Presidential 
Legislative PR 2011 2012 
Presidential Plurality 2012 2012 
U.S. Presidential 
Legislative SMDP 1942 2012 
Presidential 
Electoral 
College 
1952 2012 
Venezuela  Presidential Presidential Plurality 2006 2013 
Austria 
Semi-
Presidential 
Legislative  PR 2006 2013 
Presidential Majority 2010 2010 
France 
Semi-
Presidential 
Presidential Majority 1965 2012 
Portugal 
Semi-
Presidential 
Legislative PR 1985 2011 
Presidential Majority 2010 2011 
Romania  
Semi-
Presidential 
Legislative PR 2008 2012 
  Presidential Majority 2009 2009 
* Polls of two-party preferences under Australia’s transferable vote electoral system are excluded 
from analysis to avoid double-counting.  
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There are several important points about these data.  Firstly, we are compelled to work with vote 
intention figures that do not reflect consistent sampling or weighting strategies by different 
polling organizations or even by the same organization over time.  Older polls are more likely to 
use face-to-face and quota samples, for example, whereas recent polls may include internet 
panels.  While we ideally would like to work with data generated using a consistent 
methodology, assembling a time series that takes into account differences in weighting and 
sampling practices is impossible, as the required data are not available for most of the polls.  We 
therefore use the headline figure vote intentions as the most consistent attainable time series of 
poll data—the numbers reflect the survey houses’ best estimates of voter preferences at each 
point in time.  Where a survey house changes their sampling or weighting strategies our poll data 
will reflect this change.  Unfortunately, there is little alternative to using the headline figures, as 
these often are the only available data.  It also is the norm in previous research.
8
  
Second, survey organizations typically conduct polls over multiple days, which requires a 
number of coding decisions.  To begin with, for organizations reporting moving averages from a 
tracking poll, we use non-overlapping results.  Since most polls are conducted over multiple 
days, where possible we “date” each poll by the middle day of the period that the survey is in the 
field.
 
  For days when more than one poll result is recorded, we pool the results together into a 
                                                 
8
 These decision rules might seem innocuous but the poll universe and, especially, weighting 
have been shown to affect the reported headline figures, particularly in recent elections (Moore 
and Saad 1997; Wlezien and Erikson 2001).  This does not appear to influence the evolving 
accuracy of reported polls, at least based on analysis of presidential and congressional polls in 
the US (Erikson and Wlezien 2004; 2012; Bafumi et al. 2010).   
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single poll of polls.  During the later stages of the election cycle, we often have near day-to-day 
monitoring of vote intentions.
9
 
Third, the length of election cycles vary considerably.  Some presidential elections involve a 
five- or six-year time interval, as do some legislative elections, while run-off elections can span 
just a couple of weeks, resulting in a very short election cycle.  Because pollsters ask 
hypothetically about vote intentions for run-off elections we are able to extend our analysis 
beyond this period in some cases.  Even where the election cycles are long, polling may begin at 
different points in time in different cycles.  These all mean that the number of election cycles and 
parties for which we have poll data increases the closer we are to Election Day.  This can be seen 
in Figure 1. 
In some countries there are legal restrictions on publication of poll results on or prior to Election 
Day (for a review see Spangenberg 2003).  This means that in some cases we have missing data 
over the final days of the campaign.  In such circumstances, we carry forward the results from 
the final poll until the very end of the cycle.  Thus, our analysis understates the strength of the 
relationship between polls and the election outcome at that point in time. 
  
                                                 
9
 It is important to note that polls on successive days are not truly independent.  Although they 
do not share respondents, they do share overlapping polling periods.  Thus polls on neighbouring 
days will capture a lot of the same things, which complicates a conventional time-serial analysis.   
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Figure 1. Number of Parties for which there are Poll Data 
  
  
Polls and the Vote 
For our analysis, we also need data on the actual vote shares parties and candidates receive in the 
elections for which we have poll data, and for this we rely on a wide range of official sources and 
election data resources—details are reported in supplementary Appendix S2.   
 
Methodology 
Recall that our approach is to estimate a series of daily equations predicting the vote share from 
vote intentions for different parties (j) in different elections (k) across countries (m) from polls 
shares on each day of the timeline: 
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                        jkmTjkmTTjmTjkm
ePollbaVOTE 
    ,                 (3) 
where T designates the number of days before Election Day and ajmT represents a separate 
intercept for each party j in country m.  This is important to include because the level of electoral 
support in the polls and the vote varies systematically across parties.  If our timeline covers the 
year before Election Day, we would estimate an equation using polls from 365 days before each 
election, and then do the same using polls from 364 days in advance, and so on up to Election 
Day itself.  Recall that we are missing poll data on most of days, and so we are imputing a lot of 
data.  Because of this, we employ multiple imputation (Rubin 1987), which averages the 
coefficients across the imputed data series and adjusts the standard errors to reflect noise both 
due to imputation and residual variance.
10
  Using the resulting estimates, we can see whether and 
how preferences come into focus over time.   
We are primarily interested in the explained variances and the regression coefficients (bT) from 
these regressions.  The former tells us how well the polls predict the variation in the vote.  For 
our purposes, the root mean squared error (RMSE) is preferable to the R-squared because it 
allows us to compare different groups of elections or parties where the vote share variances 
differ.  It indicates how much of the actual vote variance is unexplained, for instance, 3.5 
percentage points on average for one set of parties by comparison with 1.5 points for another, 
                                                 
10
 Rubin (1987) shows that where γ is the rate of missing data, estimates based on m imputations 
have an efficiency that approximates to a value of (1 +
𝛾
𝑚
)−1. Since polls are missing on around 
92% of days we use 50 imputed data series, which implies a relative efficiency of 0.98 compared 
to an infinite number of imputations.  
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and so is a particularly useful measure when forecasting, which in effect is what we are doing 
here.
11
  Thus, if the RMSE declines over time, we know that polls increasingly account for the 
vote the closer the election.
12
  A decline in the RMSE would not necessarily mean that the polls 
themselves are increasingly accurate estimates of the vote.  For this, we need the regression 
coefficient (bt) relating the polls and the vote, which tells us how much of the poll division lasts 
to impact the outcome.  As the coefficient approaches 1.0, the observed poll becomes the best 
estimate of the Election Day vote share.  If the RMSE also tends toward 0, the polls increasingly 
match the vote.     
Now, we are interested in how the relationship between the polls and the vote evolves over time.  
Let use consider what we might observe, focusing on the RMSE.  Clearly, if preferences evolve 
at all, the RMSE will go down over time.  That is, the polls would increasingly predict the vote.  
As Erikson and Wlezien (2012) and Jennings and Wlezien (N.d.) posit, the exact functional form 
would depend on how much of the variance is due to long-term and short-term components, 
however.  If most of the change in preferences is short-lived, then the vote would come into 
focus late, as in the upper-left hand frame of Figure 2, where the RMSE remains fairly flat and 
then drops sharply at the end of the campaign, as late-arriving effects (increasingly) do not fully 
                                                 
11
 As the R-squared also is informative (Krueger and Lewis-Beck 2007), it is worth noting that 
those estimates and the RMSEs always are negatively correlated at 0.99 or higher for all of the 
analyses that follow.  This indicates that when the RMSE is lower, the R-squared is, almost 
without exception, higher. 
12
 Note that the improvement in predictability will reflect the variance of the shocks and the 
proportion that persists, bearing in mind that some changes will not last. 
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decay before Election Day.  By contrast, if most of the change in preferences lasts, then the vote 
would increasingly come into focus over the cycle, as in the lower left-hand frame of Figure 2.  
If both processes are at work and some of the change decays and some lasts, then the pattern 
would resemble what is depicted in the lower right-hand frame of the figure.  This is the 
dominant pattern in previous research.   
Figure 2.  Different Functional Forms of the Evolution of Electoral Preferences 
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hypothesize that the RMSEs would be consistently lower for niche parties until the very end of 
the timeline, when support for catch-all parties come into focus.  We also posited differences 
between opposition and governing parties, which we expect to show a similar, if less pronounced 
pattern, where preferences for the latter come into focus later.  Recall that we think that this may 
be especially true for large parties.  Finally, we posited possible, contrasting differences between 
new and old parties, where preferences for the former would be less structured early in the 
election cycle due to less partisan loyalties. These are our hypotheses.  Now let us see what the 
data reveal.     
 
Results 
To begin the analysis, let us consider the scatterplot between polls and the vote at various points 
of the election cycle.  This is shown in Figure 3.  The figure displays the poll share for all parties 
or candidates in all elections and countries for which we have actual polls, i.e., excluding 
imputed polls numbers.  In the upper left-hand panel of the figure, using polls that are available 
900 days before the election, fully two and a half years before an election, we see that there 
already is a discernible pattern.  That is, the poll share and the vote share are positively related, 
though there also is a good amount of variation.  At that point in time, we have polls in the field 
in approximately 40% of our cases, and this increases fairly steadily, reaching 75% one year 
before Election Day.  As we turn to polls later in the election cycle, moving horizontally and 
then vertically through the figure, a clearer pattern emerges; the poll share and final vote share 
line up.  Simply, as we get closer to the election, the polls tell us more about the outcome.  It is 
as one would expect if preferences change and a nontrivial portion lasts.  But how much do 
preferences evolve?  How does this depend on party characteristics?  
23 
 
Figure 3. Scatterplot of Party Vote Share by Party Poll Share for Selected Days of the Election 
Cycle—Pooling all Legislative Elections 
 
To provide a definitive assessment of party differences, we begin by estimating cross-sectional 
regressions of the vote division on the poll division for each date and set of parties and compare 
the relationship over time.  Specifically, we focus on the root mean squared error (RMSE), which 
tells us whether the polls become more informative about the vote as the election cycle unfolds, 
i.e., the more the polls predict the vote, the lower the RMSE.  To calculate the RMSE, one 
estimates the prediction errors from the regression, squares them, calculates the mean of those 
squared errors, and then takes the square root of the mean.  The regression includes controls for 
different parties in different countries— which effectively accounts for differences across both 
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countries and parties, recalling that party variables are country-specific.  The regression equation 
is bootstrapped to estimate the standard errors of the RMSEs, enabling us to determine whether 
the relationship between polls and the vote differs significantly across institutional settings.
13
  
For the comparison of RMSE’s to be meaningful, we need to restrict our comparison to the set of 
cases, as the number of parties for which we have polls increases the closer we are to Election 
Day (see Figures 1 and 3).
14
  For this analysis, we focus on all election cycles and parties when 
polls are in the field 200 days before Election Day, which leaves us with 212 elections and a total 
of 236 parties. 
  
                                                 
13
 In bootstrapping the regression, we assume that our sample distribution (a total of 775,703 
party*poll days) is representative of the general population of polls of vote intentions.  This is 
not an unreasonable assumption, as our data set likely contains the majority of available polls.  
To bootstrap the estimates, the regression is estimated for randomly drawn resamples (with 
replacement) of the data repeated 1,000 times for each day of the election cycle. The model is 
estimated as a linear regression with one categorical factor that allows the effects of party 
controls to be absorbed.  
14
 The regression coefficient (b) from the equation relating polls and the vote offers additional, 
supporting information.  The general pattern is that the coefficient grows over the timeline as the 
RMSE shrinks (Jennings and Wlezien N.d.).  This tells us that an increasing portion of the polls 
lasts to impact the Election Day vote, i.e., the polls converge on the final result.   
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Figure 4. Root Mean Squared Errors for Niche and Catch-all Parties  
 
Let us begin with a comparison of catch-all and niche parties.  Recall that we hypothesize that 
electoral preferences of the latter come into focus earlier in the election cycle.  To test the 
hypothesis, we estimate separate equations relating poll and vote shares for the two types of 
parties.  Our coding is based on the Manifesto Research on Political Representation (MARPOR) 
project database of party election programs which also includes classification of party families 
(Volkens et al 2014).  Following Wagner (2012, p. 845), we classify niche parties as those 
“parties that compete primarily on a small number of non-economic issues.” Our coding of niche 
parties therefore includes far-right, ethnic-regional, ecological and other special issue parties, 
while catch-all parties refer to mainstream left, right and center parties.  Figure 4 plots the 
resulting RMSEs over the final 200 days of the election cycle, based on models including party 
controls.  The patterns in the figure are consistent with our expectations.  At the beginning of the 
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timeline, 200 days out, polls are much more informative for niche parties, with an RMSE of 
about 2.5 percentage points by comparison with 4.5 points for catch-all parties.  As can be seen 
in the figure, the difference is statistically significant; that is, the confidence intervals do not 
overlap.  The gap narrows over time, with preferences for catch-all parties coming increasingly 
into focus, though niche parties vote shares are more predictable even at the very end.  Indeed, 
the predictability of the niche party vote doesn’t change at all over the last 200 days of the cycle.  
This preferences evidently come into focus very early and stay that way.  This is as 
hypothesized.
15
 
  
                                                 
15
 We have tested for differences between systems where the incumbent government is able to 
control the timing of legislative elections and those where it cannot (see Kayser 2005), and 
results suggest that preferences come into focus earlier in the former and remain so right up until 
the final days of the campaign.  These differences hold – and do not vary significantly – across 
countries with different government and electoral institutions.  For details, see Jennings and 
Wlezien (N.d.).  This makes no difference to our analyses of party characteristics.  
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Figure 5. Root Mean Squared Errors for Large and Small Parties 
 
We next turn to differences in party size.  As discussed, there is reason to think that electoral 
support for large parties crystallizes later in the election cycle.  Figure 5 shows the RMSEs for 
regressions relating the polls and the legislative vote for large and small parties, using a 20% 
vote threshold.
16
  The results in the figure indicate that party size makes a big difference in the 
structure and evolution of preferences.  Indeed, the pattern is virtually identical to what we 
observed for catch-all and niche parties, though there is some evidence that preferences for small 
parties do evolve over time, by contrast with niche parties.  The striking similarity in Figures 4 
and 5 highlights the possibility that party size is the determining factor.   
                                                 
16
  Varying the vote threshold, specifically using 15% or 10% instead, makes no real difference.  
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To assess this possibility, we separate catch-all parties by party size and estimate a separate 
series of regressions for each.  This allows us to see whether and how size matters, controlling 
for the scope of parties.  The resulting RMSEs in Figure 6 look very much like those in Figures 4 
and 5, which implies that size is what matters and not party type.  Comparing the results for 
niche parties in Figure 4 and small catch-all parties in Figure 6 suggests slight differences, 
whereby preferences for the former remain largely unchanged over time and those for latter 
change over time.  These differences are slight, however.  The differences between large and 
small parties are not.    
Figure 6. Root Mean Squared Errors for Large and Small Catch-all Parties 
 
Earlier we posited that parties’ participation in government also may make a difference for the 
evolution of electoral preferences.  Our expectation is that support for governing parties comes 
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size has an effect.  Figure 7 shows RMSEs for regressions relating polls and the legislative vote 
for all government and opposition parties, where the former includes any parties that are part of a 
governing coalition.  There we can see support for our main expectation, as preferences for the 
latter develop earlier and that preferences for government parties also become more predictive of 
the vote over time. A gap between the two types of parties remains even at the very end of the 
campaign, though the difference then is small and not always reliable.
17
  This suggests that there 
are real, if small differences in the evolution of electoral support for governing and opposition 
parties. 
Figure 7. Root Mean Squared Errors for Governing (Coalition) and Opposition Parties 
 
                                                 
17
 The estimates to some extent exaggerate the differences because we carry forward earlier polls 
on days when polls are missing in the closing days of campaigns. 
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As we already have discussed, governing parties are different and opposition parties are too and 
we expect party size to matter, particularly for the former.  Figure 8 plots the RMSEs for large 
and small governing parties and Figure 9 does the same for opposition parties, again using 20% 
of vote share as the threshold.  In Figure 8 we see that support for large governing parties is less 
structured throughout the election cycle, right up to Election Day.  By contrast, preferences for 
small governing parties evolve much as for opposition parties in Figure 7, though they are 
consistently more stable.  The results in Figure 9 indicate a similar, if less pronounced, pattern 
for large and small opposition parties.   
Figure 8. Root Mean Squared Errors for Large and Small Governing Parties 
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Figure 9. Root Mean Squared Errors for Large and Small Opposition Parties 
 
  
Thus far, we have seen that party size is an important determinant of the structure and 
development of electoral preferences, and that it accounts for most of the effects of party scope 
and government-opposition differences.  We have yet to consider the age of parties, however.  
As discussed, we expect that preferences for older parties remain more structured throughout the 
election cycle, due to stronger party loyalties. For our analysis, we begin by separating parties 
into those that formed before 1987 and those that formed in that year or thereafter. The RMSEs 
for these two groups are shown in Figure 10.  It is clear from the figure that preferences for older 
parties are in place earlier than for newer parties and this remains true throughout the election 
cycle.  This is as expected.   
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What the analysis does not allow us to distinguish is whether the pattern primarily reflects 
differences in the age of parties and not the age of representative democracies per se.  To assess 
this possibility, we focus on older democracies -- specifically, democratic regimes established 
before 1976 -- and examine the differences in the polls-vote relationship for old and new parties 
in those systems.  Figure 11 shows the resulting RMSEs for the two groups.  Here we see clear 
evidence that support for older parties is much more structured early and throughout the election 
cycle even in older democracies.  This confirms and underscores the finding in Figure 11. 
Figure 10. Root Mean Squared Errors for Old and New Parties (Parties founded before 1987 or 
from 1987 onwards) 
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Figure 11. Root Mean Squared Errors for Old and New Parties (Parties founded before 1987 or 
from 1987 onwards) in pre-1976 democracies 
 
It is worth considering whether and how party size moderates these effects.  Figure 12 depicts 
RMSE’s for regressions using large and small parties founded before 1987, as per Figure 10.  It 
is clear in Figure 12 that party size has the effects we’ve seen throughout our analysis.  (Focusing 
specifically on older democracies, as in Figure 11, produces virtually identical results.)  By 
contrast with what we saw for the differences between niche and catch-all parties and, to a lesser 
extent, governing and opposition parties, party size does not account for the differences we 
observe between old and new parties.  That is, electoral preferences for big older parties show 
much more structure than newer parties.     
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Figure 12. Root Mean Squared Errors for Large and Small Parties founded before 1987 
  
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Voter preferences evolve in a systematic way over the election timeline in a wide range of 
representative democracies.  There is structure to preferences well in advance of elections, 
indeed, years before citizens actually vote.  That is, very early polls predict the vote, at least to 
some extent.  This largely reflects differences in the equilibrium support of parties.  Polls do 
become increasingly informative over time, however, pointing to real evolution of preferences.  
That this pattern holds across countries is important and points towards a general tendency in the 
formation of electoral preferences in legislative elections.  But the pattern is not precisely the 
same for all parties.   
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Political parties structure the evolution of voters’ preferences.  The size and age of parties matter 
most of all.  Preferences for smaller and older parties crystallize early and remain strikingly 
stable over the course of the election cycle by comparison with larger and newer parties.   The 
results for smaller parties may not surprise given that many of those rely on constituencies that 
care about specific niche issues on which the party leaders concentrate.  What may surprise is 
that the effect of party size holds even for catch-all parties; indeed, the evolution of preferences 
for niche and small catch-all parties is indistinguishable, which implies that the scope of the 
parties does not matter much at all.  (That said, small parties are more likely to be niche parties 
and vice versa.)  Size moderates the effect of other variables that do influence preference 
formation, including whether parties are in government or the opposition and the age of parties 
as well.  That size matters may come as little surprise – prediction errors are larger for larger 
parties, after all – but it also is important to explain.  
One possibility is error variance.  Based on well-known research regarding sampling-induced 
variances of proportions, there is reason to expect that the error variance in observed poll shares 
for smaller parties will be lower than that for larger parties when the true levels of support 
remain unchanged.
18
  The problem with this explanation is that sampling error is quite small by 
comparison with the prediction error variance, and taking it into account only slightly reduces 
the gap in the RMSEs, and actually leaves the ratios between RMSEs for large and small parties 
essentially the same.     Another possibility is that small parties tend to be more ideologically 
extreme, support for which is in place early and enduring, much as we predicted for niche 
                                                 
18
 This expectation is not perfectly clear as it is based on theory regarding dichotomous 
proportions, which is rarely the case in our data.   
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parties.  The problem with this explanation is that far right parties are niche parties in our 
analyses and the evolution of preferences for left and right parties are not very different, so the 
resulting patterns are indistinguishable from what we saw for niche and catch-all parties.  In the 
end, it may simply be that large parties are competing for government control and votes and so 
their preferences are more elastic.  This remains to be seen.   
That preferences for older parties are structured early on is more straightforward, and precisely 
as we expected.  After all, there is a now-massive literature demonstrating the importance of 
partisan loyalties and/or dispositions for electoral preferences and that these tendencies take time 
to develop.  Electoral support for older parties should therefore be in place early and be less 
subject to change, which is what we observe.  Our results show the age of parties matters almost 
identically when taking into account the age of the representative democracy itself, i.e., the effect 
of the former is not an artifact of the latter.  All of this highlights the importance of parties as a 
central organizing institution in modern democratic polities.  
We have only scratched the surface of the variation in context.  To begin with, the effects of 
party characteristics may be conditioned by electoral and government institutions.  Do the 
patterns hold equally in both plurality and proportional systems?  In presidential and 
parliamentary systems?  Clearly, much research remains to be done, and the methodology can 
guide the way.  That said, we have learned something about the general pattern relating 
preferences and the vote over the election timeline and the structuring influences of political 
parties.  We have seen that preferences are often in place far in advance of Election Day, 
particularly for smaller and older parties, and that they evolve slowly over time, in some cases, 
e.g., niche parties, not at all.  Indeed, the final outcome is fairly clear in the polls before election 
37 
 
campaigns begin.  This is not to say that campaigns do not matter, as they do, particularly for 
certain types of parties.  Even there, it appears that the “long campaign” between elections 
matters most of all.  
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APPENDIX S1. POLL DATA 
In this supplementary appendix we provide further details of the poll data collected for this 
study.   
 
Non-Responses and Don’t Knows 
The norm in the polling industry is to adjust vote intention polls to exclude don’t knows and non-
responses.  However in a small number of cases non-responses are included in the headline 
figures and we recalculate the poll numbers to ensure that the data are standardized.  These sorts 
of adjustment are the exception but have been implemented consistently. 
 
Dating the Polls 
Since most polls are conducted over multiple days, where possible we “date” each poll by the 
middle day of the period that the survey is in the field.  For surveys in the field for an even 
number of days, the fractional midpoint is rounded down to the earlier day. Information on 
fieldwork dates is not available for all polls and in those cases we follow careful procedures to 
calibrate the date assigned to each poll. The rules for poll dating are as follows, using the first 
possible option before moving onto the next when that possibility had been exhausted: (1) if both 
fieldwork dates available, the mid-point of the start and end dates is calculated, (2) if only one of 
the fieldwork dates is available, that date is used, (3) if only the date of publication of the poll in 
the media is available, that date is used, (4) if only information on the month or week of the poll 
is available, the mid-point of the corresponding month or week is used, (5) if only information on 
the month of the poll is available and is observed during the month of the election and is known 
to be prior to the election, the first of the month is used as the start date and the final day before 
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the election day is used as the end date (and if the poll asks about voting  on “… next Monday 
[or other day]”, then the start date is instead taken as seven days before the election). 
 
Sources  
Polls were compiled from a large number of sources, with additional cross-checks and 
triangulation conducted in the case of inconsistencies or missing data.  Wherever possible, polls 
obtained from secondary poll aggregators were cross-checked and triangulated against other 
available sources, including the original cross-tabs or media reports.  Some of our largest country 
datasets were collected from archival survey repositories. These included the Roper Center for 
Public Opinion Research’s iPoll databank, the Norwegian Social Science Data Archive, the 
Australian Social Science Data Archive, the Netherlands’ Data Archiving and Networked 
Services, Canadian Opinion Research Archive, and the GESIS/Leibniz Institute for the Social 
Sciences). A number of datasets were kindly shared with us by other scholars or pollsters.  The 
sources of poll data for our largest poll collections are listed below.   
 United States: presidential trial-heat polls are from Erikson and Wlezien (2012). 
Congressional poll data consist of 1,997 polls from Bafumi et al (2010), further 
supplemented with data from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research’s iPoll 
databank.   
 United Kingdom: dataset of national surveys where respondents were asked about which 
party they would vote “if the election were held tomorrow” from Wlezien et al (2013), 
including data from Michael Thrasher, Mark Pack, Ipsos-MORI, YouGov, ICM Research 
Ltd, Gallup Political and Economic Index.   
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 Portugal: poll data kindly provided by Francisco José Veiga (see Veiga and Veiga 2004).  
 Australia: historical data from the Australian Social Science Data Archive; additional 
data from Newspoll (www.newspoll.com.au) and Roy Morgan Research 
(http://www.roymorgan.com/).  
 Ireland: poll data via Michael Marsh’s Irish Opinion Poll Archive. 
(http://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/IOPA/) 
 Germany: Forschungsgruppe Wahlen “Politbarometer” data from GESIS/Leibniz 
Institute for the Social Sciences; additional poll data from the Wahlrecht.de website 
(http://www.wahlrecht.de/). Historical poll data from the Institut für Demoskopie, 
Allensbach were obtained from replication data for Christopher Anderson’s (1995) 
Blaming the Government, via the Harvard Dataverse. 
 Netherlands: the dataset “NIPO weeksurveys 1962-2000: NIWI/Steinmetz Archive study 
number P1654” from Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS). 
 Sweden: all companies’ poll data from Johanna Laurin Gulled, Ipsos Public Affairs.  
 Italy: all companies’ poll data from Chris Hanretty and Graziella Castro. 
 Norway: the following datasets from Norwegian Social Science Data Services -- 
“Respons Analyse AS, 2005-2012” (MMA0067), “ACNielsen, 1987-1994” (MMA0455), 
“Opinion, 1988-2003” (MMA0585), “Synovate (MMI), 1987-1998” (MMA0802), “TNS 
Gallup AS, 1964-2010” (MMA0952), “Opinion, 2007-2010” (MMA1119). More recent 
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poll data was obtained from the TV2 Partibarometeret poll aggregator 
(http://politisk.tv2.no/spesial/partibarometeret/). 
 Canada: poll data from monthly Gallup reports (1942-2000); data via the Canadian 
Opinion Research Archive. 
 France: historical poll data from the publication Gallup Organization (1976) The Gallup 
International Public Opinion Polls: France, 1939, 1944-1975; contemporary poll data 
from TNS-Sofres (http://www.tns-sofres.com) and from other sources. 
 Spain: data from El Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS) (http://www.cis.es/) 
and other sources. 
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APPENDIX S2. ELECTION DATA 
We rely on a wide range of official sources and election data resources.  Official sources were 
preferred where possible.  Where official sources were not readily available, resources such as 
the Election Guide database of the International Foundation for Electoral Systems 
(www.electionguide.org) were used as an alternative or were used to cross-check the reliability 
of data obtained from unofficial sources (such as the websites of opinion pollsters and academic 
or amateur poll spotters).  Some of the older data is from Nohlen and Stöver (2010). 
 
General Resources  
The European Election Database of the Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD)  
http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/  
 
ElectionGuide, International Foundation for Electoral Systems 
http://www.electionguide.org/  
 
Political Database of the Americas: Electoral Systems and Data 
http://pdba.georgetown.edu/elecdata/arg/arg.html  
 
Election Resources 
http://electionresources.org/  
 
Nohlen, Dieter, and Philip Stöver. 2010. Elections in Europe: A data handbook.  Baden-Baden: 
Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft. 
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Country-Specific Resources  
Australian Politics and Elections Database at the University of Western Australia, 
http://elections.uwa.edu.au/  
 
Bundesministerium für Inneres, Austria, 
http://www.bmi.gv.at/cms/BMI_wahlen/nationalrat/start.aspx  
 
Federal Elections in Brazil, Brazil 
http://electionresources.org/br/index_en.html  
 
Bularian Parliament, Bulgaria 
http://www.parliament.bg/bg/electionassembly 
 
Elections Canada, Canada 
http://www.elections.ca/home.aspx 
 
Parliament of Canada, Canada 
http://www.parl.gc.ca/parlinfo/compilations/electionsandridings/ResultsParty.aspx 
 
Ministerio del Interior, Republica de Chile 
http://historico.servel.cl/ 
 
52 
 
Ministry of Interior, Cyprus 
http://www.ekloges.gov.cy/ 
 
Consejo Nacional Electoral (National Electoral Council), Republic of Ecuador 
http://resultados.cne.gob.ec/ 
 
Ministry of Justice, Finland  
http://www.vaalit.fi/ 
 
Ministry of Interior, France 
http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Elections/Les-resultats 
 
Der Bundeswahlleiter (the Federal Returning Officer), Germany 
http://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/en/index.html 
 
Ministry of the Interior, Greece 
http://ekloges.ypes.gr/ 
 
Statistics Iceland  
http://www.statice.is/Statistics/Elections/ 
 
Ministry of the Interior, Italy 
http://elezioni.interno.it/ 
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Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Japan 
http://www.soumu.go.jp/senkyo/senkyo_s/data/shugiin44/index.html 
 
Government of Malta 
http://www.gov.mt/en/Government/Government%20of%20Malta/Election%20Results/Pages/Ele
ctions-DOI-site.aspx 
 
Instituto Federal Electoral, Mexico 
http://www.ife.org.mx/portal/site/ifev2 
 
Statistics Norway, Norway 
http://www.ssb.no/a/english/kortnavn/stortingsvalg_en/tab-2009-10-15-02-en.html 
 
Electoral Commission, New Zealand 
http://www.electionresults.govt.nz/ 
 
National Office of Electoral Processes, Peru 
http://www.onpe.gob.pe/inicio.php 
 
Commission on Elections, Republic of the Philippines 
http://www.comelec.gov.ph/ 
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Comissão Nacional de Eleições, Portugal  
http://eleicoes.cne.pt/sel_eleicoes.cfm?m=raster 
 
Ministry of the Interior, Spain 
http://www.infoelectoral.mir.es/min/ 
 
Election Authority, Sweden 
http://www.val.se/in_english/previous_elections/index.html 
 
Federal Office of Statistics, Switzerland 
http://www.bfs.admin.ch/ 
 
National Electoral Council, Venezuela  
http://www.cne.gob.ve/web/estadisticas/index_resultados_elecciones.php 
 
Rallings, C. and Thrasher, M. 2007. British Electoral Facts, 1832–2006, seventh edition. 
Aldershot: Ashgate. 
 
Rallings, C. and Thrasher, M. 2010. Election 2010: The Official Results. London: Biteback 
publishing. 
